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Constraining Charming Betsy: Textual Ambiguity as a
Predicate to Applying the Charming Betsy Doctrine
INTRODUCTION
For over two centuries, the Charming Betsy doctrine has guided
United States courts when international obligations and domestic
law collide. The Charming Betsy doctrine has signaled to courts that
when international obligations and domestic law conflict with one
another, statutes enacted by Congress “ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains . . . .” 1 Since it was first applied, numerous courts have
implemented the Charming Betsy doctrine as a tool of
statutory interpretation.
Undoubtedly, Congress has the power and authority to disregard
and abrogate international agreements by passing subsequent
domestic legislation, so long as Congress demonstrates to the courts
that it intended to abrogate the international agreement by doing
so. 2 Therefore, the Charming Betsy doctrine essentially “acts as a
rebuttable presumption that Congress did not intend to place the
United States in breach of international law.” 3 In order for Congress
to rebut this presumption, Congress must provide the courts with an
“affirmative expression of congressional intent” to abrogate the
international agreement. 4 When such an affirmative expression of
congressional intent is absent from the statute’s text, the statute is
deemed ambiguous, and the interpreting court, in accordance with
the Charming Betsy doctrine, interprets the statute in such a way that
it remains consistent with international law. 5

1. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
2. Michael Franck, Note, The Future of Judicial Internationalism: Charming Betsy,
Medellin v. Dretke, and the Consular Rights Dispute, 86 B.U. L. REV. 515, 521 (2006).
3. Id. at 521–22.
4. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n,
443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979) (“Absent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely
reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights . . . .”).
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But what does it mean for Congress to provide an “affirmative
expression of congressional intent” to abrogate an international
agreement? Unfortunately, courts have not provided a
definitive answer. 6
Almost all cases that involve a conflict between a statute and an
international obligation can be put into one of two categories. The
first category consists of cases that involve a textually ambiguous
statute that conflicts with an international agreement. In these cases,
courts readily apply the Charming Betsy canon to interpret the
statute in such a way as to avoid a conflict with the international
agreement. 7 A second category is comprised of cases that involve a
textually unambiguous statute that expressly abrogates an
international agreement. 8 Courts are precluded from applying the
Charming Betsy doctrine in these cases because congressional intent
to abrogate the relevant international agreement is expressly stated in
the statute and is therefore so clear and explicit that no “other
possible construction [of the statute] remains . . . .” 9
Although courts’ willingness to apply the Charming Betsy doctrine
to cases that fit into these two categories has received extensive
attention,10 this Article presents the first analysis of the appropriateness
of Charming Betsy’s application to a third category of cases. This
“new” category consists of cases that involve a conflict between an
international obligation and a textually unambiguous statute that does
not expressly abrogate an international agreement. In other words, the
statutes involved in this third category are unlike the statutes in the
first category because they are textually unambiguous and unlike the
statutes in the second category because they do not expressly abrogate
the conflicting international agreement.
This Article proposes that courts should not apply Charming Betsy
to this third category of cases because Charming Betsy’s application is
predicated on textual ambiguity. Because of this, there is no room for

6. Franck, supra note 2, at 522.
7. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (“A treaty will not be
deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute, unless such purpose on the part
of Congress has been clearly expressed.”).
8. See, e.g., Kappus v. C.I.R., 337 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
9. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
10. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 2; see also Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations as a Matter of
Interpretation: The Use and Abuse of Charming Betsy, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1339 (2006).
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courts to apply the Charming Betsy doctrine when a statute is textually
unambiguous, regardless of whether the statute contains an express
reference to the conflicting international agreement. A textually
unambiguous statute serves as an “affirmative expression of
congressional intent,” thereby rebutting the Charming Betsy
presumption. In essence, this Article contends that cases that fall into
this third category should be treated the same as the textually
unambiguous statutes found in the second category.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I sets forth the background
to the Charming Betsy doctrine and analyzes recent landmark cases
invoking the doctrine, including cases falling within the third
category. Part II addresses three major concerns that arise when
courts fail to strictly abide by the unambiguous text of statutes.
Section II.A addresses concerns about the courts upsetting the
precedential baseline upon which Congress legislated. Section II.B
addresses concerns about denying ordinary citizens fair notice by
depriving them of the ability to decipher a statute’s meaning and
know how the statute applies to them. Finally, Section II.C addresses
the separation-of-powers concerns that arise when Congress is
required by the courts to include a clear statement in addition to a
textually
unambiguous
statute
to
abrogate
an
international agreement.
I. APPLYING CHARMING BETSY
A. Background: Charming Betsy the Case
The Charming Betsy doctrine began with Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy, 11 when the Supreme Court confronted the seizure of
the Charming Betsy, a privately owned schooner that was sailing on
the open seas, by a U.S. military vessel. 12 The captain of the Navy
vessel seized the schooner under the authority of the Federal
Nonintercourse Act, a statute that prohibited any form of trade
between France and American citizens. 13 Between the time that the
Act was passed and the time that the schooner was seized by the U.S.

11. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
12. Id. at 116; Franck, supra note 2, at 520.
13. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 77 (quoting the Federal Nonintercourse
Act, ch. 10, 1, 2 Stat. 7, 8 (1800) (repealed 1801); see also Franck, supra note 2, at 520.
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Navy, the vessel was sold from an American to a Danish citizen that
had been born in America. 14 The captain of the U.S. Navy vessel
seized the schooner believing it was still an American vessel and in
violation of the Act by engaging in trade with France. 15 Even though
the Danish citizen had papers that demonstrated that the ship was
Danish, the U.S. Navy captain seized the ship. 16 The Danish
government contested the legality of the seizure, claiming that the
ship was not American, and, therefore, seizing the ship violated
recognized principles of international law. 17
When the case was presented before the United States Supreme
Court, the issue was whether the “Charming Betsy [was] subject to
seizure and condemnation for having violated a law of the United
States.” 18 The Supreme Court agreed with the Danish government,
determining that the seizure of the schooner was unlawful because
there was no reason to believe that the schooner was an American
vessel within the meaning of the statute. 19 In his opinion, Justice
Marshall declared that “an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.” 20 Applying this standard, the Court held that
the “correct construction” of the ambiguous wording of the Act was
that a vessel must be owned by a citizen of the United States “not at
the time of the passage of the law, but at the time when the act of
forfeiture shall be committed.” 21 As the Court explained, “[i]f it was
intended that any American vessel sold to a neutral should, in the
possession of that neutral, be liable to the commercial disabilities
imposed on her while she belonged to citizens of the United States,
such extraordinary intent ought to have been plainly expressed.” 22
Over the years that followed, courts have relieved the tension

14. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 65–66; see also Franck, supra
note 2, at 520.
15. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 66.
16. Id. at 122.
17. Id. at 116; see also Franck, supra note 2, at 520.
18. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118; see also Alford, supra note 10.
19. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 121–22; see also Alford, supra note
10, at 1350.
20. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.
21. Id. at 119; see also Alford, supra note 10, at 1350.
22. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 119.
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between international obligations and domestic statutes in numerous
cases by applying Charming Betsy. Section I.B below discusses three
landmark cases that demonstrate how courts have applied the
Charming Betsy doctrine in a modern context.
B. Textual Ambiguity as a Prerequisite to the Charming Betsy
Doctrine
Each of the modern landmark cases involving Charming Betsy
involves a textually ambiguous statute that conflicts with an
international agreement. Courts have routinely required that
Congress clearly express its intent in order to abrogate an
international agreement. 23 The following cases demonstrate that
applying the Charming Betsy canon is predicated on a textually
ambiguous conflicting statute.
1. Weinberger v. Rossi
In Weinberger v. Rossi, for instance, the President entered into an
executive agreement with the Philippines providing that Filipino
citizens would receive preferential treatment for employment at U.S.
military facilities in the Philippines. 24 Three years after the
agreement, Congress enacted a statute that prohibited employment
discrimination against United States citizens at overseas military
facilities, “unless such discrimination [was] permitted by a ‘treaty’
between the United States and the host country.” 25 The issue that
the Court faced was that the word “treaty” was ambiguous—did

23. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (“A treaty will not be
deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute, unless such purpose on the part
of Congress has been clearly expressed.”).
24. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 27 n.2 (1982). This 1968 agreement was known
as the Base Labor Agreement, U.S.-Phil., May 27, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 5892 [hereinafter BLA].
In relevant part, Article I of the BLA provided:
1. Preferential Employment.—The United States Armed Forces in the Philippines
shall fill the needs for civilian employment by employing Filipino citizens, except
when the needed skills are found, in consultation with the Philippine Department of
Labor, not to be locally available, or when otherwise necessary for reasons of
security or special management needs, in which cases United States nationals may be
employed. . . .
Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 27 n.2.
25. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added); Military Selective Service Act § 106
of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–129, § 106, 85 Stat. 348, 355.
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Congress’s use of the word “treaty” in the statute refer exclusively to
treaties found in Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution, which are
“concluded by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate,” or did it also include executive agreements like the one
entered into between the President and the Filipino government,
without the advice and consent of the Senate? 26
The Court noted that if it were to interpret the statute’s use of
the word “treaty” to mean only Article II treaties, the statute would
repudiate the executive agreement obligation of the United States to
the Filipino government. 27 Accordingly, because the word “treaty”
was textually ambiguous, the Court proceeded to apply the
Charming Betsy canon and interpreted the statute in a way that
avoided the conflict with the executive agreement altogether. 28
2. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp. provides
another example of textual ambiguity being a prerequisite to
applying the Charming Betsy doctrine. The issue in Trans World
Airlines concerned a potential conflict between a 1929 international
air carriage treaty 29 and, surprisingly enough, the 1978 repeal of the
gold standard in the United States. 30 The international air carriage
treaty set limits on the liability that air carriers could incur for lost
cargo. 31 The liability limit for U.S. air carriers set by this treaty
depended on the price of gold in the United States. 32 In 1978,
Congress repealed the gold standard, 33 which had been used to set

26. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 29.
27. Id. at 31–32.
28. Id. at 32 (“It has been a maxim of statutory construction since the decision in
Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118, 2L.Ed. 208 (1804), that ‘an act of congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible
construction remains . . . .’”).
29. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), reprinted in Note following 49 U.S.C. §
1502; Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 245 (1984).
30. Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 245.
31. See id. at 247.
32. See id. at 245.
33. Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–564, § 6, 90
Stat. 2660, 2661.
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this liability limit for U.S. airlines. 34 After the repeal of the gold
standard, the Civil Aeronautics Board 35 continued to use the last
official price of gold in the United States to set the liability limit. 36
The primary issue addressed by the Court was whether the 1978
repeal of the gold standard rendered the liability limitation set by the
earlier treaty unenforceable in the United States. 37 The Court
determined that Congress’s intent as expressed in the repealing
statute’s text was ambiguous because “there was no direct conflict
between the treaty and the statute, so the Court refused to find
abrogation given that the statute did not speak to the question at
issue.” 38 It was because of the ambiguous nature of the statute that
the Court determined that Charming Betsy applied. 39 The Court
held that the treaty controlled the subsequent statute because
Congress failed to “clearly express[]” an intent to modify or repeal
the treaty. 40
3. Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Roeder I)
Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Roeder I) is another landmark
case that demonstrates that Charming Betsy’s application is
predicated on textual ambiguity. 41 As a result of the 1979 Iranian
hostage crisis, the United States entered into the Algiers Accords
with Iran, which precluded “the prosecution against Iran of any . . .
claim of . . . a United States national arising out of the events . . .
related to (A) the seizure of the 52 United States nationals on

34. See Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 248–49.
35. The Civil Aeronautics Board is the executive agency that is responsible for
overseeing the economic regulation of U.S. airlines. See id. at 245.
36. See id. at 251. The price of gold that the Civil Aeronautics Board used was $9.07
per pound of lost cargo. Id. at 245.
37. See id. at 251; see also Franck, supra note 2, at 527−28.
38. See Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (OOIDA), 724
F.3d 230, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
39. Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 252 (“There is, first, a firm and obviously sound
canon of construction against finding implicit repeal of a treaty in ambiguous
congressional action.”).
40. Id. (citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); see also Franck, supra
note 2, at 528.
41. 333 F.3d 228, 237–38 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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November 4, 1979, [and] (B) their subsequent detention.” 42 Despite
Iran’s apparent immunity from civil suits in the United States, several
Americans that were hostages during the 1979 hostage crisis sued
the Iranian government for damages, 43 and default judgment was
entered against Iran. 44 The State Department promptly moved to
intervene and vacate the default judgment, claiming that the lawsuit
was barred by Iran’s sovereign immunity that resulted from the
Algiers Accords. 45 In response to the State Department’s
intervention, Congress amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA) of 1976 and specifically referred to the case by its case
number in the legislative history in an apparent effort to exempt the
plaintiffs’ case from the Act and allow the lawsuit against
Iran to continue. 46
The question that the D.C. Circuit faced was whether the Algiers
Accords survived the FSIA amendments. 47 Despite the apparent
intent of Congress found in the amendment’s legislative history, the
court nonetheless determined that there was enough textual
ambiguity to apply the Charming Betsy doctrine. 48 The court
concluded that the required congressional intent to abrogate the
Algiers Accords was not present in the text of the statute, and,
therefore, it affirmed the order vacating the default judgment. 49 In
applying Charming Betsy, the court emphasized the amending

42. Id. at 232 (quoting Iran–United States: Settlement of the Hostage Crisis, 20
I.L.M. 223 (1981)). The Algiers Accords is an executive agreement signed in 1980. Id. at 231.
43. The former hostages sued the Iranian government under the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
44. Roeder I, 333 F.3d at 230 (noting that default judgment was entered against Iran
because it failed to defend against the suit).
45. Id. at 231.
46. Id. at 235; Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 626(c), 115 Stat. 748, 803
(2001) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (2000)). The amended Foreign Service
Immunities Act of 1976 stated that sovereign immunity would not apply if “the act is related
to Case Number 1:00CV03110(EGS) [sic] in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia.” Foreign Service Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (2000).
47. Roeder I, 333 F.3d at 235–36.
48. Id. at 237. Although the court does not invoke Charming Betsy by name, the court
nonetheless draws on the line of precedent that applies Charming Betsy. See, e.g., Trans World
Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (quoting Cook v. United States,
288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933)); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982).
49. Roeder I, 333 F.3d at 237–39; see also Franck, supra note 2, at 525–26.
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statute’s textual ambiguity by stating that “the legislation itself [was]
silent’’ on the precise point of conflict between the statute and the
prior agreement. 50 The statute was deemed insufficiently clear
because it never specifically addressed the Algiers Accords. 51
C. Textually Unambiguous Statutes that Expressly Abrogate the
Conflicting International Agreement
Courts do not apply the Charming Betsy doctrine when the text
of a statute is unambiguous and the statute expressly abrogates the
conflicting international agreement. For example, in Kappus v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, a potential conflict existed between a
section of the Internal Revenue Code and a tax treaty between the
United States and Canada. 52 An American couple resided and
worked in Canada for a year and paid Canadian taxes on their
Canadian-source income. 53 When filing their U.S. taxes, the couple
claimed a credit against their U.S. tax for all the Canadian taxes they
had paid, supposedly leaving the couple with no U.S. tax liability. 54
However, the couple received a notice from the IRS informing them
that the Internal Revenue Code limits the amount of foreign tax
credit 55 and that they were still liable to pay $6,152 in U.S. taxes. 56
The couple contended that the Code violated the terms of a tax
treaty between the United States and Canada that required the
United States to grant a credit for the entire amount of the Canadian
tax that they paid. 57 The court, however, determined that the Code’s
language was an unambiguous statutory provision enacted after the
U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty that expressly overrode any treaty
obligations that conflicted with it. 58 Because the conflict between the
50. Roeder I, 333 F.3d at 238.
51. Franck, supra note 2, at 526 (citing Roeder I, 333 F.3d at 237).
52. Kappus v. C.I.R., 337 F.3d 1053, 1053–54 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 26 U.S.C. § 59(a)(2) (2005).
56. Kappus, 337 F.3d at 1054. $6,152 is “equal to 10% of [the couple’s] pre-credit
tentative minimum tax as recalculated by the Commissioner, who applied § 59(a)(2)’s 90% cap
on the AMT foreign tax credit.” Id.
57. Id. at 1055 (citing US-Canada Tax Treaty, Art. XXIV, “Elimination of
Double Taxation”).
58. See id. at 1057–58. The U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty was signed by the United States
and Canada in 1980 and went into effect in 1984. In 1988, Congress passed the Technical and
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statute and the treaty was irreconcilable, the court applied the lastin-time rule and determined that the statute, being the more recent
legal pronouncement, abrogated the U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty. 59
D. The Problem Child: Textually Unambiguous Statutes with No
Express Reference to Conflicting International Agreements
Section I.B discussed cases in which ambiguous statutes were
interpreted to preserve preexisting international agreements or
treaties, and Section I.C discussed a case in which unambiguous
statutes expressly overrode a treaty. A third “new” category of cases
involves textually unambiguous statutes that contain no express
reference to conflicting international agreements. 60
In Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States
Department of Transportation (OOIDA), the Owner-Operator
Independent Drivers Association (OOIDA) challenged the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s (FMCSA) decision “to exempt
commercial vehicle operators licensed in Canada or Mexico from
certain statutory medical certification requirements applicable to
drivers licensed in the United States.” 61 Federal law requires that
commercial vehicle operators be licensed and have a separate medical
certification attesting to their fitness to operate a commercial vehicle
safely. 62 In order to facilitate trade, “the United States . . . entered into
‘executive agreements’ with Mexico and Canada for reciprocal

Miscellaneous Revenue Act (TAMRA), Pub. L. No. 100–647, 102 Stat. 3342, that included a
provision that expressly stated that § 59(a)(2), as well as other specified amendments, were
intended to apply regardless of any treaty obligation: “(2) Certain Amendments to Apply
Notwithstanding Treaties.——The following amendments made by the [Tax] Reform Act [of
1986] shall apply notwithstanding any treaty obligation of the United States in effect on the date
of the enactment of the Reform Act.” Kappus, 337 F.3d at 1057 (emphasis added) (quoting
TAMRA, § 1012(aa)(2) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 861 note) (2012)).
59. Kappus, 337 F.3d at 1057; see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,
599–602 (1889) (the Chinese Exclusion Cases); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 597–99
(1884) (The Head Money Cases); S. Afr. Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 121, 125–26 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). But see Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119–20 (1933) (explaining that the
relevant treaty was not abrogated, because the Act, though enacted later, made no
mention of it).
60. Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 724 F.3d 230, 234
(D.C. Cir. 2013).
61. Id. at 232.
62. Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31136(a)(3) (2012)).
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licensing of commercial drivers operating across national borders.”63
Unlike the American licensing requirement, which required a separate
medical certification, the Mexican and Canadian licensing processes
incorporated physical fitness criteria as part of their licensing
program. 64 In 2005, after the United States had entered into
reciprocal licensing agreements with Mexico and Canada that allowed
for the other two countries to continue to incorporate physical fitness
criteria as part of their licensing program, Congress passed the Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act, which
requires “all commercial vehicle operators” to abide by specific
requirements that include obtaining a separate medical certificate. 65
The Act made no mention of the reciprocal agreements with Canada
and Mexico. 66 The FMCSA proceeded to propose a rule exempting
Mexican and Canadian commercial drivers from the requirements of
the Act, thus attempting to remain in accordance with the reciprocal
agreements between the countries. 67 The OOIDA filed a petition for
review with the D.C. Circuit asking the court to set aside the
FMCSA’s final rule that exempted Mexican and Canadian commercial
drivers from the certification requirements. 68
The D.C. Circuit, in a split-panel decision, 69 determined that
while the text of the Act requiring “all commercial vehicle
operators” 70 to obtain a separate medical certificate was in fact
unambiguous, the court would not construe the statute to abrogate
existing international agreements “absent some clear and overt
indication from Congress.” 71 The D.C. Circuit cited Trans World
Airlines, Weinberger, and Roeder I to support its decision. 72
Courts are not always this up-front about labeling a statute as
textually “unambiguous” before they proceed to interpret the statute
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 233 (emphasis added) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31149(c)(1)(B), (d)(1),
(d)(3) (2012)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Judge Brown issued the opinion for the court, joined by Chief Judge Garland.
Judge Sentelle filed the dissenting opinion. Id. at 232.
70. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 234.
72. Id. at 234–35.
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in a way that avoids a conflict with international agreements. Indeed,
OOIDA was the first time that a federal appellate court had gone as
far as to label the conflicting statute as textually unambiguous before
holding that it must give way to an existing international
obligation. 73 This does not mean, however, that OOIDA is the first
case of this sort. To the contrary, courts sometimes strain to label a
statute that conflicts with an international agreement as textually
ambiguous, even when it is not. The D.C. Circuit in OOIDA should
be commended for tackling this issue squarely.
One such instance of a court straining to find textual ambiguity in
order to not abrogate an international agreement is United States v.
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 74 In PLO, a conflict arose
between a treaty that the United States had entered into with the
United Nations and the newly passed Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987
(ATA). The United States, as host country to the United Nations
Headquarters, had entered into a treaty with the United Nations in
1947 that provided that “federal, state or local authorities of the
United States” would “not impose any impediments to transit to or
from the headquarters district” of representatives of member nations
or “other persons invited to the headquarters district by the United
Nations . . . on official business.”75 In 1974, the United Nations
granted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) “observer”
status, 76 and the United States accordingly permitted the PLO
observer mission to set up offices in New York and Washington,
D.C. 77 In 1987, however, Congress passed the ATA, and in doing so
explicitly labeled the PLO as “a terrorist organization and a threat to
the interests of the United States, its allies, and to international law.” 78

73. Id. at 234 (“But the parties cite no case of quite this kind: a textually clear statute
with no express reference—or any other indication of its intended application—to conflicting
international agreements.”).
74. 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) [hereinafter PLO].
75. Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of America
Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, U.S.–U.N., art. IV, § 11, June 26, 1947,
61 Stat. 756, 761.
76. See PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1459.
77. See John M. Rogers, Intentional Contexts and the Rule that Statutes Should Be
Interpreted as Consistent with International Law, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 637, 651 (1998)
(“There were only two PLO offices in the United States at the time of the ATA, one in
Washington D.C. and the observer mission in New York.”).
78. 22 U.S.C. 5201(b) (1994).
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The ATA made it illegal for the PLO, “notwithstanding any provision
of law to the contrary, to establish or maintain an office, headquarters,
premises, or other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of
the United States.” 79
Notwithstanding this seemingly unambiguous text of the ATA,80
the district court determined that the statute’s text was ambiguous and
therefore the United States could avoid reneging on its obligations
under the U.N. Headquarters Agreement. 81 The court reasoned that
the ATA did not expressly mention the PLO observer mission or the
Headquarters Agreement. 82 Furthermore, the words “notwithstanding
any provision of law to the contrary” did not specifically say
“notwithstanding any treaty” to the contrary. 83 Even so, it is hard to say
that the statute was textually ambiguous.
II. CONCERNS THAT ARISE FROM APPLYING CHARMING BETSY TO
TEXTUALLY UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTES
Genuine textual ambiguity should be recognized as a
prerequisite for applying the Charming Betsy canon of construction.
In this Part, I discuss three major concerns that arise from applying
Charming Betsy to textually unambiguous statute—whether that
textual unambiguity is expressly recognized by the court or not.
The benefits from and reasons for applying the Charming Betsy
canon when ambiguous statutes and international agreements
conflict are well established. By interpreting an ambiguous statute as
to not interfere with a conflicting international agreement,
Charming Betsy “eliminate[s] international discord in furtherance of
an executive prerogative to comply with international obligations.” 84
The canon also supports the notion that “[i]nternational obligations
are serious matters” and that “[t]he international reputation of the
United States ought not to be jeopardized” when a conflicting
statute can be interpreted so as not to interfere with international
79. 22 U.S.C. 5202(3) (1994) (emphasis added).
80. See Rogers, supra note 77, at 650 (“[I]t is a stretch to say that there is any
interpretative gap for the court to fill here. There is only in the most fictional sense an
ambiguity as to whether the language [of the ATA] covered the mission in New York.”).
81. See PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1468.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Alford, supra note 10, at 1342.
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obligations. 85 Furthermore, the doctrine serves as an indication of “[t]he
judiciary’s respect for coordinate branches of government, to avoid the
embarrassment of declaring a statute in violation of international law in
the absence of a clear statement of repudiation by Congress.” 86
Although Charming Betsy’s application recognizes the
importance of international obligations and protects those
obligations from unintentional Congressional abrogation, applying
the canon to cases involving textually unambiguous statutes raises
three serious concerns. The first is that requiring a clear statement
from Congress in addition to unambiguous statutory text in order to
abrogate an international obligation upsets the baseline upon which
Congress legislated. This is akin to the courts changing the rule in
the middle of a game, undoing whatever deals and bargains were
made internally within the legislature to enact the statute. The
second concern that arises from applying Charming Betsy to a
statute’s unambiguous text is that doing so deprives ordinary citizens
of fair notice of the law and prevents them from understanding
which laws apply to them. By abiding to the unambiguous text of a
statute, courts can promote a more predictable judicial system where
citizens can reliably act without fear of personal liability and with
confidence in their business decisions. Finally, requiring a clear
statement when the statute’s text is unambiguous interferes with the
separation of powers between the judiciary and the other two
branches of federal government, thereby potentially leading to the
encroachment of personal liberties.
A. Concerns about Upsetting the Precedential Baseline
When Congress legislates, it does so against a predictable
baseline established by court precedent. As Congress creates new
laws, it expects federal courts to interpret those laws in a manner that
is consistent with past interpretation. With regards to international
agreements, Congress is presumably operating against the
background assumption that, according to federal court precedent,
the Charming Betsy doctrine will only be applied to a statute in order
to avoid abrogating an international agreement when the statute is
85. Franck, supra note 2, at 528.
86. Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1115 (1990).
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textually ambiguous. 87 If a court were to apply Charming Betsy in a
situation where the text of the conflicting statute is unambiguous, the
court would upset and contradict the baseline precedent upon which
Congress framed and passed its legislation. If the courts truly wish to
change the rules mid-game, they should do so only prospectively,
thereby communicating to Congress that the baseline has changed
and allow the legislature to act accordingly in the future.
Cannon v. University of Chicago 88 serves as an illustration of the
appropriate way for courts to change the rules mid-game. In
Cannon, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a private
right to sue for an alleged Title IX claim. 89 Justice Rehnquist, who
typically disfavored determining that such implied private rights of
action existed, 90 stated in his concurring opinion that he was willing
to side with the majority because, at the time that Congress had
enacted Title IX of the Civil Rights Act, “the legislature had
generally assumed that courts would decide whether a civil rights
statute contained an implied private right of action.” 91 In other
words, Justice Rehnquist recognized that Congress took into
account and relied upon the baseline that courts could, and often
would, determine that various civil rights statutes contained an
implied right of action. Because of this reliance, Congress did not see
a need to explicitly state in this context whether a private right of
action existed. 92
Although Justice Rehnquist was willing to find that a judicially
inferred private right of action existed in Cannon, he made a special
point of noting that, going forward, the Court would change

87. See supra Section I.B.
88. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
89. Id. at 689.
90. See id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing against liberal judicial
implication of private rights of action and that courts should encourage Congress to explicitly
state whether it intends to authorize such rights); see also Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context:
Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 869 (2002).
91. Mank, supra note 90, at 849–50 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718).
92. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718 (“Cases such as J.I. Case Co. v. Borak . . . and
numerous cases from other federal courts, gave Congress good reason to think that the federal
judiciary would undertake this task.”).
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course. 93 Justice Rehnquist warned Congress that it would no longer
be sufficient to rely on the courts to determine whether there would
be private rights of action, and that the legislature itself must directly
confront the issue. 94 If Congress wished to provide for private rights
to sue for violations of statutorily defined duties in the future,
Congress must explicitly provide for such rights. 95 Justice Rehnquist
commented that after Congress was put on notice by his opinion,
“the ball, so to speak, may well now be in [Congress’s] court.”96
Because it was put on notice, Congress could then “take this
changed legal climate into account and its failure to expressly
mention a private right of action in statutes subsequently enacted
will reflect a conscious decision that it not exist.” 97
By applying the Charming Betsy canon to textually unambiguous
statutes, courts are changing the rules mid-game and upsetting the
precedential baseline upon which Congress enacted the statute. The
clear precedent that has been established by the courts creates the
baseline that Charming Betsy’s application is predicated on textual
ambiguity. When Congress passes a textually unambiguous statute, the
established baseline justifiably results in Congress’s expectation that
the statute would abrogate a conflicting treaty because the statute is
textually unambiguous. When courts subsequently choose to upset
that baseline retroactively and require that Congress provide a clear
statement that expressly abrogates the international agreement in
addition to unambiguous text, courts undo any and all of Congress’s
bargains that were in place when the statute was passed. 98
Whether or not it would have been a good rule at the outset for
courts to require such a clear statement when the text of a statute is
unambiguous is wholly irrelevant—the reality remains that upsetting
the baseline upon which Congress legislates carries with it the

93. Sure enough, in later decisions following Cannon, the view of Justice Rehnquist
carried a majority of the Court. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 561–62.
94. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. William V. Luneburg, Justice Rehnquist, Statutory Interpretation, the Policies of
Clear Statement, and Federal Jurisdiction, 58 IND. L.J. 211, 254 (1983).
98. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540–41
(1983) (discussing how legislation is best understood as the result of compromises).
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consequence of undermining the intent and expectations of
Congress. Although Justice Rehnquist would have likely preferred
that Congress had not originally left it to the courts to determine
whether implied private rights of action existed in civil rights cases at
the outset, he recognized that such precedent did exist and that
there is danger in upsetting the baseline upon which Congress
legislated without first giving Congress notice of the change. 99 Only
after Justice Rehnquist provided notice to Congress that it would be
required to expressly state whether it intended to create a private
right of action was Congress held to that standard.
If courts wish to require Congress to provide a clear statement in
which it must expressly abrogate an existing treaty regardless of
textual unambiguity, then courts should exercise constraint and do
so only prospectively and after clear notice is given to Congress that
such will be the courts’ course of action moving forward. Doing so
will be in line with the principle established by Justice Rehnquist’s
concurring opinion in Cannon, properly provide Congress with the
appropriate notice, and alert it to the fact that the baseline is
changing prospectively.
B. Concerns about Denying Citizens Fair Notice of the Law
When courts interpret a statute to mean something other than
the plain meaning of the statute’s unambiguous text, they deprive
ordinary citizens of the ability to decipher the statute’s meaning and
know how the statute applies to them. Although the benefits that
result from promoting textualism have been documented in other
contexts, 100 significant benefits also result from abiding by the
unambiguous text of a statute in the context of situations where
statutes and international agreements conflict. If a statute’s text is
unambiguous, and that statute conflicts with an international
agreement, courts should abide by that unambiguous text in order
to give citizens fair notice of the law.

99. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (holding that an implied
private right of action exists while arguing against liberal judicial implication of private rights of
action and that courts should, going forward, encourage Congress to explicitly state whether it
intends to authorize such rights).
100. See, e.g., Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542 (2009).
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Giving citizens fair notice of what the law is and how it applies to
them is “an essential element of the rule of law” and promotes
“fairness, legitimacy, and social utility.” 101 When citizens have notice
of the laws and know whether those laws are applicable to them,
social efficiency increases and citizens are better able “to order their
behavior within an established legal framework.” 102 Furthermore,
citizens become “more confident taking the business risks that drive
our economy” because they “are confident that they are aware of the
applicable laws.” 103 On the other hand, if courts interpret statutes in
a way that is inconsistent with the plain meaning of their text,
citizens would be inclined to view the legal system as unpredictable
and believe that they are unable to determine what a law means by
just reading its text. 104 This is problematic because “an unpredictable
legal system can place severe limits on productivity and perpetrate
immense injustice against well-meaning individuals” 105 that take
action thinking that they know what a textually unambiguous statute
means, only to learn later courts have interpreted the statute to mean
something entirely different.
When a statute’s text is unambiguous on its face, courts cannot
expect ordinary citizens to parse through the legislative history of a
statute or strain to find ambiguity in order to understand the
meaning of a statute. Indeed, by definition, the word
“unambiguous” suggests that the text is not open to more than one
interpretation; 106 therefore, an ordinary citizen would read the text of
a textually unambiguous statute and not think that an appeal to
extrinsic sources is necessary.
Courts should first look at the plain text of the statute and
determine whether the plain meaning of the text unambiguously
101. Id. at 543.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1179 (1989) (“Even in simpler times uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the
Rule of Law. Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the means of
knowing what it prescribes. . . . As laws have become more numerous, and as people have
become increasingly ready to punish their adversaries in the courts, we can less and less afford
protracted uncertainty regarding what the law may mean.”).
105. Textualism as Fair Notice, supra note 100, at 551.
106. Unambiguous: “[H]aving or being a single clearly defined or stated meaning.”
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2482 (1993).
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contradicts an international agreement. If it does, then courts should
“stop[] there and appl[y] the text according to that clear
meaning.” 107 Doing so would ensure that courts “reach the
interpretation of the text that most accurately reflects how citizens
would understand it,” 108 thereby interpreting the statute in the way
that the citizens that are subject to the statute would fairly expect
it to apply. 109
It is true that canons of construction, such as the Charming Betsy
doctrine, “facilitate fair notice in a more general way [b]y
establishing predictable, objective rules for interpreting statutes.” 110
But using a canon of construction is appropriate only when there is
textual ambiguity. 111 When the text of a statute is unambiguous, a
court’s application of a canon of construction such as Charming
Betsy is likely to lead to more confusion rather than providing the
ordinary citizen with fair notice by establishing a predictable,
objective rule. This is especially true in situations where applying the
canon of construction leads the court to reach the exact opposite
conclusion about the statute that an ordinary citizen would reach by
simply reading the statute’s text.
For example, an ordinary citizen that reads a federal statute that
requires “all commercial vehicle operators” to abide by a specific
medical requirement 112 is almost certainty going to reach the
conclusion that the medical requirement statutorily applies to all
commercial vehicle operators, irrespective of national origin or any
other factors because that is what the text of statute plainly says. The
statute says “all,” so the ordinary citizen reader would have no
reason to think the statute meant anything other than “all.” Even

107.
108.
109.

Textualism as Fair Notice, supra note 100, at 558.
Id.
See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 17 (1960) (noting that all laws should be predictable to their subjects).
110. Textualism as Fair Notice, supra note 100, at 560.
111. See generally Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Making Laws Moral: A Defense of Substantive
Canons of Construction, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 915 (2001) (encouraging judges to implement
substantive canons of construction when statutes’ text are ambiguous); see also Textualism as
Fair Notice, supra note 100, at 559 (“[W]hen ambiguity cannot be resolved by the use of
definitional tools or simple attention to context, the textualist turns to traditional
canons of construction.”).
112. Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 724 F.3d 230, 233
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
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though the court interpreting this statute expressly stated that the
text was “unambiguous,” 113 the court proceeded to deviate from that
unambiguous text by implicitly applying the Charming Betsy canon
of construction and ultimately holding that, by saying “all
commercial vehicle operators,” the legislature really must have meant
“all commercial vehicle operators besides those that operate out of
Mexico and Canada.” 114 An ordinary citizen would not have thought
to apply the Charming Betsy doctrine115 because the text of the
statute in this situation was clear and unambiguous.
Applying Charming Betsy when the text of a statute is
unambiguous deprives ordinary citizens of fair notice, undermines
their ability to apply the law for themselves, and decreases the legal
literacy of the general public. On the other hand, faithful adherence
to the legislature’s commands as unambiguously expressed through
the text of statutes “ensures that parties to a suit will be bound by
the law as they would have reasonably interpreted it.” 116 Abiding by
the unambiguous text of statutes promotes fair notice to citizens,
which in turn promotes a system in which judicial interpretation is
more predictable. 117 A more predictable judicial system has high
social utility because it promotes fundamental fairness and equality.
As a result of a predictable judicial system that promotes these
values, “citizens can reliably act without fear of personal liability and
with confidence in their business decisions.” 118
C. Separation of Power Concerns
The Supreme Court has stated, “[T]he separation of
governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to
the preservation of liberty.” 119 There has always existed a “hydraulic

113. Id. at 234.
114. Id. at 236–38.
115. This is assuming, of course, that an ordinary citizen even knows what the
Charming Betsy canon of construction is, which he or she almost certainly would not. This
even further bolsters the argument that, in situations when the text of a statute is unambiguous
and it conflicts with an international agreement, courts should abide by the unambiguous text
because that is what the ordinary citizen can know and familiarize him or herself with.
116. Textualism as Fair Notice, supra note 100, at 562.
117. Id. at 563.
118. Id.
119. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
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pressure” within each of the three branches of government to exceed
their constitutional limits and encroach upon the powers of the other
branches. 120 Although the separation-of-powers doctrine is not
explicitly set forth in the Constitution, it “is nonetheless deeply
rooted in the Constitution and is designed to prevent the
‘commingling’ of the various powers of the government.” 121 It is
therefore vital that the separation of powers be maintained.
Requiring Congress to provide a clear statement, in addition to
unambiguous statutory text, in order to abrogate an international
agreement interferes with the separation of powers between the
judicial, executive, and legislative branches. In implementing this
heightened clear statement requirement in the context of executive
agreements, the judiciary is essentially siding with the executive
branch because it increases the burden placed on Congress of what it
must do to abrogate an executive agreement.
This separation-of-powers concern is magnified when the
international agreement is an executive agreement and not a treaty.
While treaties are entered into pursuant to the Constitution’s Treaty
Clause, 122 executive agreements can be entered into by relatively lowranking members of the executive branch. 123 “If ‘[d]istorting
statutory language simply to avoid conflicts with treaties would
elevate treaties above statutes in contravention of the Constitution,’
distorting statutory language to avoid conflicts with international
[executive] agreements even more obviously contravenes
the Constitution.” 124

120. See Jamil Jaffer, Comment, Congressional Control over Treaty Interpretation, 70 U.
CHI L. REV. 1093, 1097 (2003) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
121. Id. at 1097 (quoting O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933)).
122. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving the President “Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided that two thirds of the Senators
present concur”).
123. For example, in OOIDA, the executive agreement with Mexico was made between
the U.S. Secretary of Transportation and the Mexican Secretary of Communications and
Transportation, and the agreement with Canada was entered into as a result of letters
exchanged between “two transportation bureaucrats in the United States and Canada.” See
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (OOIDA), 724 F.3d 230, 241
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
124. OOIDA, 724 F.3d at 241 (quoting Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 472
F.3d 872, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
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The choice of whether to renege on a promise made in an
international agreement is a choice best left to the political branches
of government, not the judiciary. 125 The Supreme Court has stated
that the choice to act in direct contravention of a treaty or
international agreement “belong[s] to diplomacy and legislation, and
not to the administration of the laws.” 126 Indeed, it is entirely within
Congress’s authority to abrogate or rescind international
agreements, and “[t]he political considerations that must be
balanced prior to such a decision are beyond both the expertise and
mandate of [the courts].” 127 Therefore, it is inappropriate for the
courts to second-guess Congress’s decision to abrogate an
international agreement if the abrogating statute’s text is
unambiguous. Second-guessing Congress’s action interferes with the
legislature’s constitutionally sanctioned ability to abrogate such
agreements and risks putting a court in a position where it is making
a diplomatic policy decision.
Although courts are sometimes asked to fill a quasi-legislative
role with regard to international obligations when a conflicting
statute is ambiguous, such instances should be limited to occasions
where the abrogating statute’s text is ambiguous and not expanded
to include instances where the statute’s text is unambiguous.
Sometimes, “when a court is faced with two possible constructions
of the law, and the court is not entirely sure which is correct, it in
effect has a legislative choice.” 128 In this sense, “the court acts as a
sort of interim legislature, deciding which way the statute should
operate until the legislature says otherwise.” 129 This quasi-legislative
role of the courts, however, should be strictly limited to situations
where Congress’s intent is not clearly expressed in the statute’s text.
If the text of a statute is unambiguous, then the interpreting court
does not have a legislative role to fill because Congress has already
done the work for the court. For the court to continue in this
legislative role despite the presence of unambiguous text is cause for
serious separation-of-powers concerns. The courts should not
125. See Jaffer, supra note 120, at 1098.
126. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888).
127. Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140, 144–45 (D.D.C. 2002)
aff’d, 333 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
128. Rogers, supra note 77, at 640.
129. Id.
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supplant the legislature in enacting anything other than the words of
the statute when those words are unambiguous. If the unambiguous
text leads to a result that Congress did not intend or foresee, it can
resolve any issues by enacting additional legislation. Indeed, when
“[t]he language of the statute is entirely clear, and if that is not what
Congress meant then Congress has made a mistake and Congress
will have to correct.” 130 It is certainly not the job of the judiciary to
protect Congress from itself, especially when doing so interferes with
separation of powers.
CONCLUSION
Applying the Charming Betsy canon of construction should be
predicated on textual ambiguity as the modern precedent applying
Charming Betsy suggests. When courts apply Charming Betsy to
textually unambiguous statutes—whether the statute is expressly
recognized by the court as textually unambiguous or not—three
major concerns arise. The first concern is that applying Charming
Betsy to a textually unambiguous statute upsets the precedential
baseline upon which Congress legislated. If courts wish to change
course and require a clear statement rule from Congress despite
textual unambiguity, they should do so only prospectively after they
have provided the legislature with appropriate notice that there is a
change in direction going forward. Such notice will give Congress
the opportunity to take the necessary measures going forward to
avoid confusion with the courts.
The second concern that arises from applying Charming Betsy to
a textually unambiguous statute is that doing so denies ordinary
citizens fair notice of the law by depriving them of the ability to
determine a statute’s meaning and to know how the statute applies
to them. Because of this, courts should limit their use of canons of
construction generally, and Charming Betsy specifically, to situations
in which the statute’s text is ambiguous. Fostering fair notice among
citizens increases citizens’ confidence in the judiciary, which in turn
promotes individual decisions that benefit society.
Finally, separation-of-powers concerns arise when Congress is
required by the courts to include a clear statement in addition to a
130. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 528 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment).
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textually unambiguous statute to abrogate an international
agreement. The choice of whether to abrogate an international
agreement is a choice best left to the political branches of
government—not the judiciary. Although courts must sometimes fill
a quasi-legislative role when the text of a statute is ambiguous,
fulfilling this role is wholly inappropriate when Congress has
expressed its will through unambiguous statutory text.
In sum, to determine whether a statute abrogates a conflicting
treaty or executive agreement, courts should first look to the
statutory text. If the text provided by the legislature is unambiguous,
the judiciary’s role is finished, and it should ignore any conflicting
international agreements or treaties that might exist. If the text is
ambiguous, only then should the deciding court apply the Charming
Betsy canon and interpret the statute in a way that is consistent with
the existing treaties or agreements.
Andrew H. Bean
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